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INFORMAL COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES
Wayne A. Logan*
After a thirty-year punitive binge, the nation is in the process of
awakening to the vast array of negative effects flowing from its
draconian crime control policies.1 The shift is perhaps most evident in
the realm of corrections, which since the early 1980s has experienced
unprecedented population growth. 2 Driven by a number of factors, not
the least of which is the enormous human and financial cost of mass
incarceration, 3 policy makers are now shrinking prison and jail
populations 4 and pursuing cheaper non-brick-and-mortar social control
options. 5
This Essay examines another facet of the shift: increasing concern
over collateral consequences, the many ostensibly non-penal sanctions
attaching to convictions, which have proliferated in recent years 6 and
*

Gary & Sallyn Pajcic Professor of Law, Florida State University College of Law. Thanks to Jack
Chin, Matthew Lister, Margaret Colgate Love, and Jenny Roberts for their very helpful comments
on the paper. Thanks also to participants at the collateral consequences workshop hosted by the
University of Minnesota Law School’s Robina Institute, especially Professors Anthony Duff and
Susan Sered, who provided valuable insights as commentators. Finally, thanks go to Josephine
Ennis, J.D. 2013, for her expert editorial assistance.
1. On the political and social catalysts behind the nation’s shift toward increased punitiveness
more generally, see JONATHAN SIMON, GOVERNING THROUGH CRIME: HOW THE WAR ON CRIME
TRANSFORMED AMERICAN DEMOCRACY AND CREATED A CULTURE OF FEAR (2007); Paul J. Larkin,
Jr., Public Choice Theory and Overcriminalization, 36 HARV. J.L. & POL’Y 715, 722–55 (2013).
2. See LAUREN E. GLAZE & ERIKA PARKS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CORRECTIONAL POPULATIONS
IN THE UNITED STATES, 2011, at 1 fig.1 (2012), available at http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/
cpus11.pdf.
3. The reform efforts of the “Right on Crime” movement, comprised mainly of fiscal
conservatives otherwise typically staunch crime-control advocates, evidence this shift. See RIGHT
ON CRIME, http://www.rightoncrime.com/ (last visited Aug. 21, 2013).
4. See NICOLE D. PORTER, THE SENTENCING PROJECT, ON THE CHOPPING BLOCK 2012: STATE
PRISON CLOSINGS (2012), available at http://sentencingproject.org/doc/publications/On%20the%20
Chopping%20Block%202012.pdf.
5. See id.; see also THE PEW CTR. ON THE STATES, STATE OF RECIDIVISM: THE REVOLVING
DOOR OF AMERICA’S PRISONS 6 (2011); Mary D. Fan, Beyond Budget-Cut Criminal Justice: The
Future of Penal Law, 90 N.C. L. REV. 581, 636–40 (2012).
6. See Kathleen M. Olivares et al., The Collateral Consequences of a Felony Conviction: A
National Study of State Legal Codes 10 Years Later, 60 FED. PROBATION, Sept. 1996, at 10, 11–15
(surveying marked increase in collateral consequences between 1986 and 1996); Michael Pinard,
Reflections and Perspectives on Reentry and Collateral Consequences, 100 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 1213, 1214–15 (2010) (“At no point in United States history have collateral
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impose disabilities that often dwarf in personal significance the direct
consequences of conviction, such as imprisonment. 7 Long the focus of
critical scholarly commentary, 8 collateral consequences recently drew
the attention of the Supreme Court in its landmark decision Padilla v.
Kentucky 9 holding that defendants have a Sixth Amendment right to be
informed of a collateral consequence (in Padilla, deportation) attaching
to a guilty plea. 10 Further testament to the national concern, the
American Bar Association is now compiling a comprehensive inventory
of collateral consequences imposed nationwide, 11 casting in bold relief
the many “invisible punishments” to which convicted individuals are
subject. 12
The attention now being paid to collateral consequences is most
assuredly welcome. Missing from the reappraisal, however, is attention
to the range of informal consequences of conviction. Unlike formal
collateral consequences, such as loss of public housing eligibility,
deportation,
occupational
disqualification,
or
electoral
disenfranchisement, these consequences do not attach by express
operation of law. Rather, they are informal in origin, arising
independently of specific legal authority, and concern the gamut of
negative social, economic, medical, and psychological consequences of
conviction. For instance, it is well known that a criminal conviction can
legally disqualify an individual from an occupation and housing; yet, a
conviction also has a very negative impact on individuals’ job and
housing prospects even absent such formal disqualifications. No less
significant are the negative social and economic effects felt by third
consequences been as expansive and entrenched as they are today.”).
7. The category of “collateral consequences” actually encompasses two forms of non-penal
disability: a “collateral sanction,” imposed by operation of law as a result of conviction; and a
discretionary “disqualification,” also arising from conviction, but imposed after an individualized
inquiry by a legal authority. See UNIF. COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES OF CONVICTION ACT §§ 2(2),
(5), 8 (2010), available at http://www.uniformlaws.org/shared/docs/collateral_consequences/uccca_
final_10.pdf. Consistent with common usage, the broader category is used here.
8. For just a few of the myriad examples, see Neil P. Cohen & Dean Hill Rivkin, Civil
Disabilities: The Forgotten Punishment, 35 FED. PROBATION, June 1971, at 19; Nora V.
Demleitner, Preventing Internal Exile: The Need for Restrictions on Collateral Sentencing
Consequences, 11 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 153 (1999); Michael Pinard, An Integrated Perspective
on the Collateral Consequences of Criminal Convictions and Reentry Issues Faced by Formerly
Incarcerated Individuals, 86 B.U. L. REV. 623 (2006).
9. 559 U.S. 356 (2010).
10. Id. at 360.
11. See AM. BAR ASS’N, http://www.abacollateralconsequences.org/CollateralConsequences/
map.jsp (last visited Aug. 22, 2013).
12. Jeremy Travis, Invisible Punishment: An Instrument of Social Exclusion, in INVISIBLE
PUNISHMENT: THE COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES OF MASS IMPRISONMENT 15, 16 (Marc Mauer &
Meda Chesney-Lind eds., 2002) (coining phrase).
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parties of convicted individuals, especially dependents, yet these effects
too have gone largely unacknowledged in the post-Padilla discourse.
This Essay makes the case that attention should be directed to the
array of formal and informal collateral consequences alike that are
associated with criminal conviction. Part I provides an inventory of
informal collateral consequences, which include the negative effects for
individuals of stigma, diminished housing and economic opportunities,
and ways in which conviction can adversely affect the well-being of
third parties, such as family members. Part II examines the meager
extent to which such consequences have figured in criminal justice
doctrine and policy to date, especially relative to plea advisement and
negotiation, and argues for a more robust understanding. Part III offers
recommendations on how this fuller understanding can be
operationalized.
The task undertaken here is as timely as it is important. While the
nation’s appetite for incarceration appears to be waning, 13 state, local,
and federal criminal justice systems continue to adjudicate millions of
cases annually, 14 and little reason exists to conclude that criminal
prosecution and conviction will abate as the preferred public response to
misconduct. 15 As criminal justice actors and policymakers have become
sensitized to the adverse effects of the formal collateral consequences of
conviction, so too should they take account of informal collateral
consequences, which can have an equal if not greater effect on
individuals’ lives.
I.

INFORMAL COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES

A criminal conviction, while a culminating event in the criminal
justice process, carries with it an array of negative consequences. The
most concrete and well-known consequence involves the deprivation of

13. See E. ANN CARSON & WILLIAM J. SABOL, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, PRISONERS IN 2011, at 1
(2012), available at http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/p11.pdf (noting that during 2011 the
number of prisoners in state and federal facilities declined by 0.9%, the second consecutive year of
population decrease).
14. See GLAZE & PARKS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 2, at 1 (noting that at yearend 2011
just under 7,000,000 individuals were under adult correctional supervision of some kind, roughly
one of every thirty-four residents).
15. See WILLIAM J. STUNTZ, THE COLLAPSE OF AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE 55–56 (2011)
(tracing nation’s evolution toward view that “a healthy criminal justice system should punish all the
criminals it can.”); David Cole, Turning the Corner on Mass Incarceration?, 9 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L.
27, 44–49 (2011) (lauding recent decreases in imprisonment rates but questioning whether they will
be sustained when budgetary conditions improve, absent greater public sensitivity for the adverse
human consequences of mass imprisonment).
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liberty, by means of imprisonment or community supervision. 16 Perhaps
less well known, until Padilla at least, conviction very often also triggers
an array of formal collateral consequences.17 This Part provides an
overview of the many informal collateral consequences of conviction,
arising outside formal operation of law, significantly affecting the lives
of convicted individuals. These negative consequences, ranging from
social stigma to diminished housing and employment opportunities, very
often also have a spill-over effect on friends and family.
Social stigma has long been recognized as a defining consequence of
criminal conviction. 18 While in the past opprobrium associated with
criminal status visibly manifested in physical branding and mutilation,19
over time, societies, including early America, adopted a more forgiving
outlook. As the New York Court of Appeals put it in 1936, persons
convicted of crimes are “not outcasts, nor to be treated as such.” 20
In recent decades, however, this forgiving sentiment has been
replaced by a far harsher view. Today, convict status serves as a
perpetual badge of infamy, even serving to impugn reputation beyond
the grave. 21 One data point highlighting this shift is found in the
significantly decreased application of the executive pardon authority. 22
Another is the current nationwide network of sex offender registration
and community notification laws, which took root in the 1990s. 23 The
laws require the assemblage of conviction and personal identifying
information on eligible individuals, and make the information publicly
available by way of the internet and other means, often for registrants’
lifetimes. 24 Fairly capturing modern sentiment, Chief Justice Rehnquist
16. See GLAZE & PARKS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 2, at 1–2 (noting that at yearend
2011 almost 7,000,000 individuals were under adult correctional supervision and that roughly
seventy percent of this population was on probation or parole).
17. See supra notes 6–12 and accompanying text.
18. See Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Aims of the Criminal Law, 23 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 401, 405
(1958).
19. See Pieter Spierenburg, The Body and the State: Early Modern Europe, in OXFORD HISTORY
OF THE PRISON: THE PRACTICE OF PUNISHMENT IN WESTERN SOCIETY 48 (Norval Morris & David
J. Rothman eds., 1995).
20. People v. Pieri, 199 N.E. 495, 499 (N.Y. 1936).
21. Perhaps the most notable example of this can be found in how, after police fatally shot an
unarmed man, then-Mayor of New York City Rudolph Giuliani, in an effort to curb public uproar,
stressed that the victim had a criminal record. See Eric Lipton, Giuliani Cites Criminal Past of Slain
Man: Pressed on Shooting, Mayor Criticizes Victim, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 20, 2000, at B1.
22. See Margaret Colgate Love, When the Punishment Doesn’t Fit the Crime: Reinventing
Forgiveness in Unforgiving Times, 38 HUM. RTS., Summer 2011, at 2, 5–6.
23. For discussion of the history and social and political catalysts behind the laws, see WAYNE A.
LOGAN, KNOWLEDGE AS POWER: CRIMINAL REGISTRATION AND COMMUNITY NOTIFICATION LAWS
IN AMERICA 49–108 (2009).
24. See id. at 49–84 (discussing laws).
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posited in the 2002 oral argument in Smith v. Doe, involving a
constitutional challenge to registration and community notification, that
targeted individuals “deserve[] stigmatization.” 25
Stigma can affect individual well-being in a variety of ways. Research
dating back to the 1960s, for instance, highlights the significant social
and psychological difficulties associated with criminal stigma. 26 More
recent research makes clear that stigma can have a self-fulfilling
criminogenic effect, predisposing individuals to become the deviants
they were branded to be. 27 It is also not uncommon for convicts to be
singled out for death, beatings, arson, and vandalism by fellow
community members. 28
A criminal record can also have profound economic impact, serving
in Professor James Jacobs’ words as a “negative curriculum vitae” for
individuals. 29 Criminal records, now more readily available than ever
before, 30 have been shown to significantly diminish near and long-term
economic well-being. 31 A criminal conviction often serves as a de facto
informal basis for job denial, 32 augmenting occupational bars triggered
25. Transcript of Oral Argument at 29, Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84 (2003) (No. 01-729), available
at http://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/01-729.pdf.
26. See ERVING GOFFMAN, STIGMA: NOTES ON THE MANAGEMENT OF SPOILED IDENTITY (1963);
SHLOMO SHOHAM, THE MARK OF CAIN: THE STIGMA THEORY OF CRIME AND SOCIAL DEVIATION
(1970).
27. See, e.g., Bruce C. Link & Jo C. Phelan, Conceptualizing Stigma, 27 ANN. REV. SOC. 363
(2001); Terri A. Winnick & Mark Bodkin, Anticipated Stigma and Stigma Management Among
Those to Be Labeled “Ex-Con,” 29 DEVIANT BEHAV. 295 (2008). Such outcomes, it warrants
mention, are fostered by the common use by police of individuals’ criminal histories to justify
searches and seizures. See, e.g., United States v. Erwin, 155 F.3d 818 (6th Cir. 1998); United States
v. Myers, 106 F.3d 936 (10th Cir. 1997); United States v. Henry, 48 F.3d 1282 (D.C. Cir. 1995).
Police resort to such information has been significantly eased by the advent of portable hand-held
devices. See Wendy Ruderman, New Tool for Police Officers: Records at Their Fingerprints, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 12, 2013, at A17 (noting officer use of new handheld smartphone devices that allow for
immediate access to individuals’ criminal records).
28. See LOGAN, supra note 23, at 125–27.
29. James Jacobs & Tamara Crepet, The Expanding Scope, Use, and Availability of Criminal
Records, 11 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 177, 177 (2008).
30. See id. at 177–78.
31. See JOAN PETERSILIA, WHEN PRISONERS COME HOME: PAROLE AND PRISONER REENTRY
112–20 (2003); JEREMY TRAVIS, BUT THEY ALL COME BACK: FACING THE CHALLENGES OF
PRISONER REENTRY 151–85 (2005); Devah Pager, The Mark of a Criminal Record, 108 AM. J. SOC.
937 (2003).
32. On the disinclination of employers to hire ex-offenders more generally, see Harry J. Holzer et
al., Will Employers Hire Former Offenders?: Employer Preferences, Background Checks, and Their
Determinants, in IMPRISONING AMERICA: THE SOCIAL EFFECTS OF MASS INCARCERATION 205,
209–10 (Mary Pattillo et al. eds., 2004). Research also makes clear that even employers reluctant to
acknowledge a policy of not hiring ex-offenders show a marked disinclination to actually hire exoffenders. See Devah Pager & Lincoln Quillian, Walking the Talk?: What Employers Say Versus
What They Do, 70 AM. SOC. REV. 355 (2005). On the disparate racial effects of this phenomenon,
see Roberto Concepción, Jr., Need Not Apply: The Racial Disparate Impact of Pre-Employment
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by formal operation of law. 33 More subtly, conviction can function to
disrupt or sever social ties that can be key to finding employment. 34 And
even when able to secure a job, convicted individuals on average enjoy
much lower earning capacity than individuals without a conviction.35
Dashed or limited employment prospects, research has also shown, in
turn fuel depression and lessen perceived self-worth, further impairing
employment prospects. 36
Housing opportunities are also negatively affected by convict status.
While statutes and regulations impose formal legal limits on public
housing opportunities, 37 landlords in the private sector often informally
use criminal history as a screening device.38 The fact of criminal
conviction, ex-convicts report, serves as the single greatest impediment
to securing housing. 39 In turn, homelessness itself, in addition to making
such matters as job searches far more difficult, increases the likelihood
of subsequent arrest and conviction. 40
Finally, conviction affects far more than the convicted individual.
Family and friends endure secondary stigma and ostracism as a result of
their connection to convicts, 41 and it is not uncommon for them to
experience spill-over violence and disdain. 42 It should also come as no
Criminal Background Checks, 19 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL’Y 231 (2012); Devah Pager et al.,
Sequencing Disadvantage: Barriers to Employment Facing Young Black and White Men with
Criminal Records, 623 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 195 (2009).
33. See Marc Mauer, Introduction: The Collateral Consequences of Imprisonment, 30 FORDHAM
URB. L.J. 1491, 1493 (2003) (noting variety of formal occupational prohibitions).
34. David Wolitz, The Stigma of Conviction: Coram Nobis, Civil Disabilities, and the Right to
Clear One’s Name, 2009 BYU L. REV. 1277, 1313–14.
35. Bruce Western et al., The Labor Market Consequences of Incarceration, 47 CRIME &
DELINQ. 410 (2001).
36. See, e.g., Andrew E. Clark et al., Lags and Leads in Life Satisfaction: A Test of the Baseline
Hypothesis, 118 ECON. J. 222, 233 (2008).
37. See Eumi K. Lee, The Centerpiece to Real Reform?: Political, Legal, and Social Barriers to
Reentry in California, 7 HASTINGS RACE & POVERTY L.J. 243, 254 (2010).
38. Eric Dunn & Marina Grabchuk, Background Checks and Social Effects: Contemporary
Residential Tenant-Screening Problems in Washington State, 9 SEATTLE J. SOC. JUST. 319, 325–26
(2010); Rebecca Oyama, Note, Do Not Re(Enter): The Rise of Criminal Background Tenant
Screening as a Violation of the Fair Housing Act, 15 MICH. J. RACE & L. 181, 183 (2009).
39. KATHARINE H. BRADLEY ET AL., CMTY. RES. FOR JUSTICE, NO PLACE LIKE HOME: HOUSING
AND THE EX-PRISONER 8 (2001), available at http://b.3cdn.net/crjustice/a5b5d8fa98ed957505_hq
m6b5qp2.pdf.
40. J. McGregor Smyth, Jr., From Arrest to Reintegration: A Model for Mitigating Collateral
Consequences of Criminal Proceedings, 24 CRIM. JUST. 42, 47–48 (2009).
41. See, e.g., Todd R. Clear et al., Incarceration and the Community: The Problem of Removing
and Returning Offenders, 47 CRIME & DELINQ. 335, 341 (2001).
42. See, e.g., Isolde Raftery, Man Sentenced to Life for Killing Sex Offenders; Judge Chastises
Supporters,
U.S.
NEWS
ON
NBCNEWS.COM
(Sept.
18,
2012,
6:31
PM),
http://usnews.nbcnews.com/_news/2012/09/18/13943695-man-sentenced-to-life-for-killing-sexoffenders-judge-chastises-supporters (recounting Washington State case where two men were shot
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surprise that the limited housing opportunities of convicts negatively
affect their families and dependents; 43 so too do employment barriers, 44
denied access to federal government loans for education and training 45
and eligibility for food stamps. 46 And, when conviction results in
incarceration, others very often feel its negative effects. Imprisonment
significantly increases risk of sexual 47 and physical assault 48 and
exposure to serious medical problems (such as HIV, tuberculosis, and
hepatitis). 49 It also adversely affects mental health, 50 creating significant
difficulties for individuals that impair their ability to function when
released. 51 These health-related outcomes can have a direct impact on
family members, exacerbating financial hardships experienced,52 with
the situation being made worse when the inmate is a sole caregiver.53
“because they were sex offenders,” and locals who considered the shooter a hero stalked the wife of
one of the victims, spat on her family and threw objects at her car).
43. See Heidi Lee Cain, Comment, Housing Our Criminals: Finding Housing for the Ex-Offender
in the Twenty-First Century, 33 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 131 (2003); Scott Duffield Levy, The
Collateral Consequences of Seeking Order Through Disorder: New York’s Narcotics Eviction
Program, 43 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 539 (2008).
44. See Sharon M. Dietrich, Criminal Records and Employment: Ex-Offenders Thwarted in
Attempts to Earn a Living for Their Families, in CMTY. LEGAL SERVS., INC. & CTR. FOR LAW &
SOC. POLICY, EVERY DOOR CLOSED: BARRIERS FACING PARENTS WITH CRIMINAL RECORDS 13, 14
(2002); K. Babe Howell, Broken Lives from Broken Windows: The Hidden Costs of Aggressive
Order-Maintenance Policing, 33 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 271, 296 (2009).
45. See 20 U.S.C. § 1091(r)(1) (2006) (rendering ineligible any student who has been convicted
of an offense involving the sale or possession of a controlled substance).
46. See LEGAL ACTION CTR., AFTER PRISON: ROADBLOCKS TO REENTRY: A REPORT ON THE
STATE LEGAL BARRIERS FACING PEOPLE WITH CRIMINAL RECORDS 12 (2004), available at
http://www.lac.org/roadblocks-to-reentry/upload/lacreport/LAC_PrintReport.pdf.
47. Tonisha R. Jones & Travis C. Pratt, The Prevalence of Sexual Violence in Prison: The State of
the Knowledge Base and Implications for Evidence-Based Correctional Policy Making, 52 INT’L J.
OFFENDER THERAPY & COMP. CRIMINOLOGY 280, 289 (2008).
48. See Nancy Wolff et al., Physical Violence Inside Prisons: Rates of Victimization, 34 CRIM.
JUST. & BEHAV. 588, 595 (2007) (noting that inmate violence rate is more than ten times that of the
rate in the community at-large).
49. Michael Massoglia, Incarceration, Health, and Racial Disparities in Health, 42 LAW &
SOC’Y REV. 275, 280, 295–96 (2008); Michael Massoglia, Incarceration as Exposure: The Prison,
Infectious Disease, and Other Stress-Related Illnesses, 49 J. HEALTH & SOC. BEHAV. 56 (2008);
Jason Schnittker & Andrea John, Enduring Stigma: The Long-Term Effects of Incarceration on
Health, 48 J. HEALTH & SOC. BEHAV. 115 (2007).
50. See Craig Haney, The Psychological Impact of Incarceration: Implications for Post-Prison
Adjustment, in PRISONERS ONCE REMOVED: IMPACT OF INCARCERATION AND REENTRY ON
CHILDREN, FAMILIES, AND COMMUNITIES 33, 37–46 (Jeremy Travis & Michelle Waul eds., 2003)
[hereinafter PRISONERS ONCE REMOVED].
51. Id. at 46–48, 54–56.
52. See Jeremy Travis & Michelle Waul, Prisoners Once Removed: The Children and Families of
Prisoners, in PRISONERS ONCE REMOVED, supra note 50; Leslie Acoca & Myrna S. Raeder,
Severing Family Ties: The Plight of Nonviolent Female Offenders and Their Children, 11 STAN. L.
& POL’Y REV. 113 (1999).
53. See PETERSILIA, supra note 31, at 228–29. In some instances, of course, physical removal of a
parent can have a beneficial effect. However, research establishes that even criminally active
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TOWARD A MORE ROBUST UNDERSTANDING

The consequences surveyed above, while long known to social
scientists, have to date eluded the attention of criminal justice system
policymakers and actors. This Part makes the case for a needed broader,
more robust understanding of collateral consequences, one inclusive of
those that arise informally beyond formal operation of law.
Lack of sensitivity to the range of negative extralegal consequences of
conviction is widespread in the criminal justice system. Courts, for
instance, while prone to acknowledge the stigmatizing effect of
conviction, 54 typically fail to lend legal significance to its associated
negative impact. The disinterest was on abundant display in the 2003
Supreme Court decision Smith v. Doe, 55 where the Court concluded that
Alaska’s sex offender registration and community notification law was
punitive in neither intent nor effect, allowing it to be imposed
retroactively consistent with the Constitution’s Ex Post Facto Clause. 56
According to the Smith majority, while public dissemination of
conviction information might have “adverse consequences,” including
“public shame,” “humiliation,” and “social ostracism,” with a “lasting
and painful impact,” targeted individuals were not subject to additional
punishment. 57
From a doctrinal perspective, the Smith majority’s conclusion that the
overt shaming effects of registration and community notification do not
qualify as additional punishment is subject to critique. 58 At the same
time, however, the majority’s presumption that convictions have
informal punitive effect is important, and builds upon recent academic
work concerning the “experience of punishment.” 59 As Professor John
Bronsteen and his co-authors establish, when considering the
proportionality of a given sanction, attention must be paid to the range of
negative hedonic consequences that predictably attend conviction,60
even when not resulting from formal operation of law. 61
parents can and do provide positive-parenting influence, as well as needed financial support. Id.
54. See, e.g., Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 872 (1997) (noting the “opprobrium and stigma of a
criminal conviction”).
55. 538 U.S. 84 (2003).
56. Id. at 103–04.
57. Id. at 99–101.
58. See LOGAN, supra note 23, at 136–41.
59. See John Bronsteen et al., Retribution and the Experience of Punishment, 98 CALIF. L. REV.
1463 (2010) [hereinafter Bronsteen et al., Experience of Punishment]; John Bronsteen et al.,
Happiness and Punishment, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 1037 (2009).
60. Bronsteen et al., Experience of Punishment, supra note 59, at 1486.
61. Such a fuller legal understanding, it should be noted, does not require adoption of an unduly
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Even more significant as a possible objection is the potentially
contingent and individualized experiential nature of disabilities, a matter
now the subject of lively debate among penal theorists. 62 While in some
instances the psychological, physical, social, and economic hardships of
conviction discussed above might be mitigated or avoided altogether as a
result of individual circumstances, this reality does not alter the baseline
of convict experience. An individual’s unusual personal charisma or
relative educational attainment, for instance, might lessen the difficulty
of securing employment, but the extralegal disability itself, not shared by
the non-convict population at large, is worthy of recognition.
A similar point might be made with respect to criminal stigma. It too
can have a variable quality, depending on the nature of the underlying
offense, 63 and perhaps even among certain individuals 64 and subpopulations. 65 Yet even accepting this, its derogatory nature can scarcely

expansive view of state agency as punisher. While the consequences discussed here are not
expressly prescribed by legal code, they trace to conviction, a quintessential act of government. Nor,
from a policy and prudential perspective, does their extralegal quality make them any less real and
debilitating to those affected. Of late, the question of “who” imposes punishment has been a central
point of contention for a number of contemporary retributive theorists, who maintain that
experiences must be intentionally imposed by authorized state agents to qualify as punishment. See
David Gray, Punishment as Suffering, 63 VAND. L. REV. 1619, 1650–51, 1664 (2010); Dan Markel
et al., Beyond Experience: Getting Retributive Justice Right, 99 CALIF. L. REV. 605, 619–20 (2011).
I take no position on whether extra-legal harms should justify, from a retributivist perspective, a
punishment “sentencing adjustment[]” as such. See Markel et al., supra, at 619. Indeed, collateral
consequences, including those of an informal nature, are as a technical matter non-punitive in
character. Just the same, the disavowal of state responsibility reflects a troubling indifference to the
ramifications of government action. As the Court unanimously noted in the context of a challenge to
Alabama’s forced disclosure of NAACP membership lists:
It is not sufficient to answer, as the State does here, that whatever repressive effect compulsory
disclosure of names . . . may have . . . follows not from state action but from private [action].
The crucial factor is the interplay of governmental and private action, for it is only after the
initial exertion of state power represented by the production order that private action takes
hold.
NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 463 (1958); see also Brown v. Socialist
Workers ‘74 Campaign Comm., 459 U.S. 87, 93 (1982) (noting that there need only be a
“reasonable probability” that the compelled disclosure of names would subject individuals to
“threats, harassment, or reprisals from either Government officials or private parties” (quoting
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 74 (1976))).
62. See Richard A. Bierschbach, Proportionality and Parole, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 1745, 1765 n.95
(2012) (citing work dating back to the 1990s and recent resurgence of interest in the issue).
63. Convictions for sex offenses, in particular, generate perhaps the most ill will of all. On the
reasons thought to account for this, see LOGAN, supra note 23, at 91.
64. See, e.g., Stephen P. Garvey, Can Shaming Punishments Educate?, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 733,
748 (1998) (“An offender has to care what others think about him; otherwise, shame can get no grip
on him. The broader and deeper [an offender’s] attachments, the greater will be his shame. If he
lacks the requisite attachments . . . he will . . . be ‘shameless’ . . . .”) (footnote omitted).
65. See id. at 749 (asserting that shaming will have less “retributive bite” if an individual’s
“attachments run to a criminal subculture, in which case ‘shaming’ him may perversely become a
source of pride”).
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be questioned. 66 As Professor Alexandra Natapoff recently observed,
“for a person who has been publicly transformed from law-abiding
citizen into criminal, a significant psycho-social line has been
crossed.” 67
Likewise, the fact that not all convicts will experience an informal
disability, and that its onerousness might be individualized, should not
diminish the need to acknowledge such effects. Indeed, purely as a
matter of statistical likelihood, the empirical commonality of their
occurrence affords principled basis for their consideration. 68 More
significant, notwithstanding the indisputably wholesale nature of the
modern adjudicatory process, defendants enjoy a retail-level right to
individualized justice, 69 one sensitized to such variable effects.
Despite the foregoing, the justice system has been reluctant to attach
importance to post-conviction disabilities. Courts have only occasionally
taken into account harm suffered by third parties when assessing the
propriety of punishments, almost always in the federal white-collar
context, 70 and as a rule ignore the reputational harms suffered by those
ensnared in the criminal process. 71 And, until Padilla, courts typically
refused to require pre-plea advisement of formal collateral
consequences. 72
66. For evidence of this, one need only consider recent efforts by jurisdictions to subject other
offender groups to registration and notification, and the proliferation of for-profit Internet websites
and tabloids that publish “mug shots” of individuals merely arrested for offenses, often of a very
minor nature. See, e.g., Holly Zachariah, Convicted Dealers Featured on Web, THE COLUMBUS
DISPATCH (Nov. 11, 2012, 6:28 AM), http://www.dispatch.com/content/stories/local/2012/11/11/
convicted-dealers-featured-on-web.html (convicted drug dealers); BUSTED MUGSHOTS,
http://www.bustedmugshots.com (last visited Aug. 23, 2013) (arrests for broad array of non-serious
offenses, such as trespassing, public intoxication and loitering). Profits also flow to entities charging
fees to have the public mug shots removed. See Susanna Kim, Businesses Charge Hundreds To
Remove Mug Shots Online, ABCNEWS.COM (Apr. 23, 2012), http://abcnews.go.com/
Business/businesses-make-profit-copying-mug-shots-online-critics/story?id=16157378.
67. Alexandra Natapoff, Misdemeanors, 85 S. CALIF. L. REV. 1313, 1327 (2012).
68. See supra notes 18–54 and accompanying text.
69. See, e.g., In re Dir. of Assigned Counsel Plan of N.Y.C., 603 N.Y.S.2d 676, 686 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. 1993) (noting that the “right to individualized justice . . . is a hallmark of our constitutional and
democratic system”).
70. See Darryl K. Brown, Third-Party Interests in Criminal Law, 80 TEX. L. REV. 1383, 1390–91
(2002). This solicitude, Professor Brown concluded from a review of judges’ sentencing
explanations, is due in significant part to “defendants and third parties in those settings more often
prompt[ing] empathy.” Id. at 1421.
71. See, e.g., Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693 (1976). For a critique of Paul v. Davis, with particular
attention paid to its precedential use by courts concluding that publicized conviction information
does not trigger procedural due process protection, see Wayne A. Logan, Liberty Interests in the
Preventive State: Procedural Due Process and Sex Offender Community Notification Laws, 89 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1167 (1999).
72. See Gabriel J. Chin, The New Civil Death: Rethinking Punishment in the Era of Mass
Conviction, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 1789, 1814–15 (2012). As Professor Chin observes, however,
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Padilla, along with the Court’s more recent opinions in Missouri v.
Frye 73 and Lafler v. Cooper, 74 also evincing critical concern over the
workings of the nation’s plea-driven criminal justice system, 75 signal a
welcome reality-based understanding of the system’s extralegal
quality. 76 Padilla in particular might also signal a desire on the part of
the Court to do away with the long-criticized doctrinal divide between
direct and collateral consequences more generally, 77 requiring courts, as
Professor Bibas recently urged, to “focus[] on the importance of
particular consequences rather than their criminal or civil labels.”78
Already, the influence of Padilla is showing tangible effect in decisions
that extend its logic beyond the context of deportation, 79 highlighting the
need to conceive of the challenge at hand in terms of “mass conviction,
not (just) mass incarceration.” 80
III. OPERATIONALIZING CHANGE
Presuming that informal collateral consequences warrant attention,
the practical question arises of how they can be made more salient in the
day-to-day criminal justice process. This Part outlines the ways in which
this can occur, focusing in particular on the institutional roles of the
chief actors in the nation’s plea-dominated system.
Without question, responsibility for highlighting the informal
although unmentioned in Padilla itself, concern over collateral consequences actually did figure in
prior decisions of the Court, shaping constitutional criminal procedure in areas including the right to
counsel and jury trial. Id. at 1822–25.
73. __U.S.__, 132 S. Ct. 1399 (2012) (holding that defense counsel’s failure to inform a client of
a favorable plea offer constitutes ineffective assistance of counsel).
74. __U.S.__, 132 S. Ct. 1376 (2012) (holding that defense counsel’s mistaken legal
understanding, inducing a client to reject a plea offer, constitutes ineffective assistance of counsel).
75. Id. at 1388 (noting that over ninety percent of convictions in state and federal courts result
from guilty pleas).
76. See Josh Bowers, Two Rights to Counsel, 70 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1133, 1133 (2013) (noting
that the three cases cement a “right to extralegal counsel [that] applies exclusively to the
comparatively unstructured domains of the plea-bargain and guilty plea” (emphasis added)).
77. Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 364–65 (2010). On the persistent confusion characterizing
the issue of direct versus collateral consequences, with only the former kind of consequence
requiring advisement by counsel, see Jenny Roberts, Ignorance Is Effectively Bliss: Collateral
Consequences, Silence, and Misinformation in the Guilty-Plea Process, 95 IOWA L. REV. 119, 124–
25 (2009).
78. Stephanos Bibas, Regulating the Plea-Bargaining Market: From Caveat Emptor to Consumer
Protection, 99 CALIF. L. REV. 1117, 1147 (2011); see also id. (“The Sixth Amendment test should
be not whether a consequence is labeled civil or collateral, but whether it is severe enough and
certain enough to be a significant factor in criminal defendants’ bargaining calculus.”).
79. See Margaret Colgate Love, Collateral Consequences after Padilla v. Kentucky: From
Punishment to Regulation, 31 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 87, 105–11 (2011).
80. Chin, supra note 72, at 1803.

10 - Logan Essay.docx (Do Not Delete)

1114

WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW

10/10/2013 10:59 AM

[Vol. 88:1103

collateral consequences of conviction will fall chiefly upon defense
counsel. 81 Any suggestion, however, of adding more duties to defense
counsel—especially already overburdened and underpaid public
defenders—will likely prompt immediate objection. Indeed, Padilla,
while lauded by the defense bar in principle, has triggered concern for
the added counseling burdens it imposed on defenders. 82 Deportation, at
issue in Padilla, affords a foremost example, requiring an understanding
of a highly specialized and complex body of statutes and regulations. 83
The consequences at issue here, however, do not require sophisticated
legal expertise. Nor will apprising clients of such consequences impose
much in the way of added time commitment, a particular concern to
already overburdened public defenders. 84 Counsel will simply be obliged
to highlight to clients the adverse economic, social, and personal
consequences possibly resulting from conviction, in keeping with
increasingly accepted holistic lawyering norms. 85
Other institutional actors, however, can and should also play a role.
As for prosecutors, acknowledgment of the full consequences of
conviction aligns with their core duty to “seek justice” in individual
cases. 86 At the same time, consistent with the teachings of procedural
justice, 87 appearing to do justice by being open and transparent affords
broader public legitimacy benefit. As Robert Johnson, former head of

81. See Libretti v. United States, 516 U.S. 29, 50 (1995) (“[I]t is the responsibility of defense
counsel to inform a defendant of the advantages and disadvantages of a plea agreement . . . .”).
82. See, e.g., Darryl K. Brown, Why Padilla Doesn’t Matter (Much), 58 UCLA L. REV. 1393,
1397–1413 (2011); Shanthi Prema Raghu, Supporting the Criminal Defense Bar’s Compliance with
Padilla: It Begins with Conversations, 9 SEATTLE J. SOC. JUST. 915, 922, 928 (2011).
83. See Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 369 (2010); see also id. at 378 (Alito, J., concurring)
(noting that it is often “not an easy task” to determine whether conviction for a particular offense
will trigger deportation).
84. See Wayne A. Logan, Litigating the Ghost of Gideon in Florida: Separation of Powers as a
Tool to Achieve Indigent Defense Reform, 75 MO. L. REV. 885 (2010) (discussing state and national
data regarding enormous public defender caseloads and litigation mounted to help ameliorate the
situation).
85. See, e.g., Michael Pinard, Broadening the Holistic Mindset: Incorporating Collateral and
Reentry into Criminal Defense Lawyering, 31 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1067 (2004); McGregor Smyth,
Holistic Is Not a Bad Word: A Criminal Defense Attorney’s Guide to Invisible Punishments as an
Advocacy Strategy, 36 U. TOL. L. REV. 479 (2005); see also Kim Taylor-Thompson, Tuning Up
Gideon’s Trumpet, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 1461, 1502 (2003) (urging that defense counsel “maintain
a working knowledge of the potential sentencing consequences of any negotiated settlement”).
86. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.8 cmt. 1 (2010); STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL
JUSTICE: PROSECUTION FUNCTION AND DEFENSE FUNCTION § 3-1.2(c) (1993); see also Catherine
A. Christian, Collateral Consequences: Role of the Prosecutor, 54 HOW. L.J. 749, 750 (2011) (“[A]
just and fair prosecutor will consider the collateral consequences that may apply . . . and take them
into account when considering a disposition.”).
87. See generally TOM R. TYLER & YUEN J. HUO, TRUST IN THE LAW: ENCOURAGING PUBLIC
COOPERATION WITH THE POLICE AND COURTS (2002).
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the National District Attorneys Association has stated, when prosecutors
fail to disclose the full consequences of a brokered conviction they risk
“suffer[ing] the disrespect and los[ing] the confidence of the very society
we seek to protect.” 88
With informal collateral consequences put on the table, so to speak,
the parties will be better positioned to efficiently negotiate outcomes
based on what Padilla called “informed consideration” of the nature and
scope of the consequences of conviction.89 It can also be hoped that with
fuller awareness of the actual consequences of conviction, the balance of
negotiating power will be affected,90 resulting in increased use of
diversion and deferred prosecution arrangements, avoiding the negative
effects of conviction altogether. 91
Ultimately, greater understanding of the range of consequences
associated with conviction could likewise mitigate what has been called
“plea bargaining’s innocence problem”: the possibility of legally
innocent defendants pleading guilty to a lesser offense in order to avoid
being subjected to much harsher punishment as a result of trial. 92 Such
susceptibility is perhaps especially at play with individuals charged with
minor offenses, who possibly plead guilty simply so that they can be
released from detention. 93
Finally, judges can and should play a role. Already, in the wake of
Padilla, consideration is being given to expanding Rule 11 plea colloquy
expectations of judges. 94 While not a substitute for particularized advice
88. Robert M.A. Johnson, Collateral Consequences, CRIM. JUST., Fall 2001, at 32, 33. Cf. Paul H.
Robinson & John M. Darley, The Utility of Desert, 91 NW. U. L. REV. 453 (2000) (arguing that
aligning criminal liability with community’s shared sense of fairness and proportionality affords
consequentialist benefits).
89. See Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 373 (2010).
90. See Stephanos Bibas, Plea Bargaining Outside the Shadow of Trial, 117 HARV. L. REV. 2463,
2470–77 (2004) (discussing effect of information asymmetries on bargaining positions of parties);
Russell D. Covey, Fixed Justice: Reforming Plea Bargaining with Plea-Based Ceilings, 82 TUL. L.
REV. 1237, 1240–41 (2008).
91. See Margaret Colgate Love, Alternatives to Conviction: Deferred Adjudication as a Way of
Avoiding Collateral Consequences, 22 FED. SENT’G REP. 6 (2009).
92. See Lucian E. Dervan & Vanessa A. Edkins, The Innocent Defendant’s Dilemma: An
Innovative Empirical Study of Plea Bargaining’s Innocence Problem, 103 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 1 (2013). In an effort to redress scholarly uncertainty over the extent of the
problem’s occurrence, the authors report the results of a clinical study in which over half of the
study’s innocent participants were willing to falsely admit guilt in return for a reduced punishment.
Id. at 36–37.
93. See id. at 38 (noting that the study’s results in this regard conform with prior work raising
concern over factually innocent low-level offenders pleading guilty).
94. See COMMUNICATION FROM THE CHIEF JUSTICE, THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED
STATES TRANSMITTING AMENDMENTS TO THE FEDERAL RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE THAT
HAVE BEEN ADOPTED BY THE SUPREME COURT, PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. 2072, H.R. DOC. NO. 11325, at 3–4 (2013) (amendment to Rule 11 adopted by the Supreme Court requiring notice of possible
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by counsel, 95 the sentencing court can reinforce to a pleading defendant
the informal collateral consequences of conviction.96 Judicial
advisement will have particular benefit, again, for the large number of
defendants charged with minor offenses, who if indigent lack access to
publicly provided counsel at the plea negotiation stage as a result of
constitutional doctrine 97 or procedural rule. 98 Indeed, public
acknowledgement of such consequences by judges in open court will
have the salutary effect of highlighting the broader human consequences
of the nation’s penchant for criminal convictions. 99
While the focus here has been on the duties of defense counsel,
prosecutors, and judges, it should be noted that these actors need not go
it alone. Indeed, the path can be paved by bar associations and other
entities that can provide instruction and training on informal collateral
consequences, much as they have done already in the wake of Padilla
with respect to the immigration consequences of conviction. 100
CONCLUSION
When it comes to criminal justice, we live in promising times. At long
last, draconian sentencing policies are being reconsidered and the
collateral consequences of conviction, triggered by formal operation of
statutes and regulations, are attracting the critical attention of courts and

immigration consequences of conviction).
95. See Danielle M. Lang, Note, Padilla v. Kentucky: The Effect of Plea Colloquy Warnings on
Defendants’ Ability to Bring Successful Padilla Claims, 121 YALE L.J. 944, 949–60 (2012)
(discussing why a court’s plea colloquy cannot serve as a substitute for adequate advisory assistance
of defense counsel).
96. This reinforcement, it should be noted, is particularly important because, unlike formal
collateral consequences, informal collateral consequences are not susceptible of back-end
administrative or judicial relief. See Love, supra note 79, at 121–26 (describing current and possibly
future avenues of relief from formal collateral consequences).
97. See Alabama v. Shelton, 535 U.S. 654, 662 (2002) (reaffirming the “actual imprisonment”
standard prescribed in Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972)).
98. See, e.g., Justin Marceau & Nathan Rudolph, The Colorado Counsel Conundrum: Plea
Bargaining, Misdemeanors, and the Right to Counsel, 89 DENV. U. L. REV. 327 (2012) (describing
Colorado rules and practice allowing for “pre-counsel” pleas in misdemeanor cases).
99. This Essay, it should be emphasized, has focused solely on individual defendant-level effects.
Research, however, has made clear that mass convictions and incarceration have major negative
social, political, and economic effects on poor and minority communities as a whole. See, e.g.,
Dorothy E. Roberts, The Social and Moral Cost of Mass Incarceration in African American
Communities, 56 STAN. L. REV. 1271 (2004). For an argument that such impact should be
considered by sentencing judges in particular cases, see Anne R. Traum, Mass Incarceration at
Sentencing, 64 HASTINGS L.J. 423 (2013).
100. See, e.g., N.Y.C. BAR ASS’N, PADILLA V. KENTUCKY: THE NEW YORK CITY CRIMINAL
COURT
SYSTEM,
ONE
YEAR
LATER
4
(2011),
available
at
http://www2.nycbar.org/pdf/report/uploads/PadillaCrimCtsCJOReportFINAL6.15.11.pdf.
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policymakers. While surely a positive development, this shift in
consciousness has been lacking in a fundamentally important respect: it
has ignored the range of informal collateral consequences also attending
conviction yet not arising by formal operation of law, which can have
equal if not greater negative effect on individuals.
This Essay has sought to redress this deficit and make the case that
informal, and not just formal, collateral consequences should figure in
the nation’s post-Padilla effort to achieve a fairer and more transparent
criminal justice system. While without question Padilla marks a
critically important development in the Supreme Court’s willingness to
regulate the nation’s plea-dominated system, 101 it is unlikely that the
change urged here will come about as a result of constitutional mandate.
Rather, the change will of necessity result from the work of front-line
criminal justice actors determined to ensure that individuals facing
criminal conviction are sensitized to their prospective membership in
what has been aptly called “a stigmatized caste, condemned to a lifetime
of second-class citizenship.” 102

101. See, e.g., Bibas, supra note 78, at 1118 (noting that Padilla “marks a watershed in the
Court’s approach to regulating plea bargains”).
102. James Forman, Jr., Racial Critiques of Mass Incarceration: Beyond the New Jim Crow, 87
N.Y.U. L. REV. 21, 31 (2012).

